Osuolale Alalade

The transformations in the global security landscape in the last two decades have been phenomenal. Notwithstanding a lack of common universal understanding regarding the structure of the post-Cold War global system; whether the systemic structure is multipolar or a hegemonic pax-American age, strategic interaction in the post-Cold War, sign-posted by the events of 9/11, is generally appreciated as increasingly complex by the day, more uncertain, more turbulent and characterised by violent engagements of a myriad of non-state forces across the globe who are impacting on the constantly evolving strategic landscape confronting both the dominant state actors as well as second and third rank elements of the global system. These new forces, mobilised by fundamentalist ideo-religious visions that are driven by passion more potent than that of secular ideology, have become central to the contemporaneous chapter of the grand narratives of the evolution of human society. They have generated greater animosity than the historic antagonism associated with the struggle of the secular theologies of capitalism and communism. They have thus thrust themselves as the crucial factors impinging strategic policy formulation at all levels.

These structural transformations in the global system are further compounded in Africa by the profound changes across a broad spectrum of factors that impact power and therefore continentalpolicy calculus since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa. The end of the Cold War critically altered the overarching political environment for elite and hegemonic forces operating in Africa. The altered global environment in the post-Cold War enabled the reinstatement of an 1884 Berlin syndrome; a syndrome that was de-validated by the prostrate helplessness of Europe after WWII and the ascendance of the messianic impulses of the United States and its transcendental moral authority as the leader of the free world in 1945. Associated with the resurgence of the Berlin syndrome in the post-Cold War is the subtle revalidation of a logic of neo-colonial re-appropriation of the prized estates in Africa and the consolidation in the post-Cold War of neo-colonial claims of national pre carre and exclusive orbits of influence by former colonial forces in Africa. The important change for Africa is the ascendance of realism, neo-conservatism and the relative decline of the messianic impulses of the United States. Accordingly, the United States has joined the race, even if in very nuanced stances. Rather than reassert its historic repudiation of this ugly resurgence of the Berlin mindset, the new United States realism, whether under the leadership of a liberal or a neo-conservative administration, has meant it aggressively promoting its national interests where they do not converge with any of the traditional neo-colonial forces and at the same time conniving with these same forces when deemed strategic to do so. This United States thus does deals to sacrifice its lesser values in Africa, if greater American national interests are thereby protected. Africa has therefore remained a pawn on this systemic chessboard. The practical implication of this is the unfortunate continuity of the discounted interests of Africa across the board. Therefore, the African security landscape is principally characterised by interventions of extra-African forces before and since our flag independence. This has been accentuated in the post-Cold War, but with a twist as France, the entrenched hegemonic force in Africa, and the United States of America engage in open competition for the control of the destiny of Africa.

•U.S Africa Command established by the U.S in Africa in 2007

The clashing interests and collaborative connivance of the major external elite forces are projected in their comprehensive interventions on the continent. The overt competition between the United States and France are expressed in the refurbishment and the transformations in the global security landscape in the last two decades have been phenomenal. Notwithstanding a lack of common universal understanding regarding the structure of the post-Cold War global system; whether the systemic structure is multipolar or a hegemonic pax-American age, strategic interaction in the post-Cold War, sign-posted by the events of 9/11, is generally appreciated as increasingly complex by the day, more uncertain, more turbulent and characterised by violent engagements of a myriad of non-state forces across the globe who are impacting on the constantly evolving strategic landscape confronting both the dominant state actors as well as second and third rank elements of the global system. These new forces, mobilised by fundamentalist ideo-religious visions that are driven by passion more potent than that of secular ideology, have become central to the contemporaneous chapter of the grand narratives of the evolution of human society. They have generated greater animosity than the historic antagonism associated with the struggle of the secular theologies of capitalism and communism. They have thus thrust themselves as the crucial factors impinging strategic policy formulation at all levels.

These structural transformations in the global system are further compounded in Africa by the profound changes across a broad spectrum of factors that impact power and therefore continentalpolicy calculus since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa. The end of the Cold War critically altered the overarching political environment for elite and hegemonic forces operating in Africa. The altered global environment in the post-Cold War enabled the reinstatement of an 1884 Berlin syndrome; a syndrome that was de-validated by the prostrate helplessness of Europe after WWII and the ascendance of the messianic impulses of the United States and its transcendental moral authority as the leader of the free world in 1945. Associated with the resurgence of the Berlin syndrome in the post-Cold War is the subtle revalidation of a logic of neo-colonial re-appropriation of the prized estates in Africa and the consolidation in the post-Cold War of neo-colonial claims of national pre carre and exclusive orbits of influence by former colonial forces in Africa. The important change for Africa is the ascendance of realism, neo-conservatism and the relative decline of the messianic impulses of the United States. Accordingly, the United States has joined the race, even if in very nuanced stances. Rather than reassert its historic repudiation of this ugly resurgence of the Berlin mindset, the new United States realism, whether under the leadership of a liberal or a neo-conservative administration, has meant it aggressively promoting its national interests where they do not converge with any of the traditional neo-colonial forces and at the same time conniving with these same forces when deemed strategic to do so. This United States thus does deals to sacrifice its lesser values in Africa, if greater American national interests are thereby protected. Africa has therefore remained a pawn on this systemic chessboard. The practical implication of this is the unfortunate continuity of the discounted interests of Africa across the board. Therefore, the African security landscape is principally characterised by interventions of extra-African forces before and since our flag independence. This has been accentuated in the post-Cold War, but with a twist as France, the entrenched hegemonic force in Africa, and the United States of America engage in open competition for the control of the destiny of Africa.

The clashing interests and collaborative connivance of the major external elite forces are projected in their comprehensive interventions on the continent. The overt competition between the United States and France are expressed in the refurbishment and establishment of their direct military presences on the continent, often competing and also collaborative engagement in the management of the conflicts, including in the handling of the challenge of asymmetric wars in Sahelo–Sahara, in the Senegalese basin, and in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, where the Boko Haram has gained global attention as well as in Mali, Libya, among others. These conflicts provide the rationale or rationalisations for the intensification of a new scramble for Africa by the United States and France.

On 19-21 February 2003, French President Jacques Chirac hosted a Paris summit of African heads of state, entitled: “Africa and France, Together in a New Partnership.” Many countries traditionally considered outside France’s sphere of influence were invited by President Chirac. Only President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire refused to come or send a high-level delegation. The global Franco-American rivalry that dominated the summit led to public recrimination between Rwandan President Paul Kagame, aligned with the US, and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade supporting France. Attacking the US, Chirac proposed cutting subsidies of First World agricultural exports to African countries. The British press, suspicious of France’s African policy, reacted hysterically to that summit. The Financial Times of London complained that Chirac had “kidnapped European policy” on Africa.

•Chirac: Hosted the Paris summit entitled ‘Africa and France

A decade after, on 6 and 7 December, 2013, France convoked 40 African heads of state to the Elysee Summit for Peace and Security in Africa in Paris. The summit was strategically timed as France prepared to launch its second military intervention in the continent in the year. Having undermined South Africa’s naïve intervention in the Central African Republic, CAR, France has increased its force to at least 1,000 soldiers in the country. France’s CAR intervention came at the end of a major French military operation in Mali, which was ostensibly motivated by the need to liberate the country from jihadist control. Meanwhile, France has upgraded its base in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, and will increase its rapid deployment force permanently stationed there to over 4000 in 2014.