Rethinking Nigeria’s Policy In A More Complex Landscape

Osuolale Alalade The transformations in the global security landscape in the last two decades have been phenomenal. Notwithstanding a lack of common universal understanding regarding the structure of the post-Cold War global system; whether the systemic structure is multipolar or a hegemonic pax-American age, strategic interaction in the post-Cold War, sign-posted by the events of 9/11, is generally appreciated as increasingly complex by the day, more uncertain, more turbulent and characterised by violent engagements of a myriad of non-state forces across the globe who are impacting on the constantly evolving strategic landscape confronting both the dominant state actors as well as second and third rank elements of the global system. These new forces, mobilised by fundamentalist ideo-religious visions that are driven by passion more potent than that of secular ideology, have become central to the contemporaneous chapter of the grand narratives of the evolution of human society. They have generated greater animosity than the historic antagonism associated with the struggle of the secular theologies of capitalism and communism. They have thus thrust themselves as the crucial factors impinging strategic policy formulation at all levels. These structural transformations in the global system are further compounded in Africa by the profound changes across a broad spectrum of factors that impact power and therefore continentalpolicy calculus since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa. The end of the Cold War critically altered the overarching political environment for elite and hegemonic forces operating in Africa. The altered global environment in the post-Cold War enabled the reinstatement of an 1884 Berlin syndrome; a syndrome that was de-validated by the prostrate helplessness of Europe after WWII and the ascendance of the messianic impulses of the United States and its transcendental moral authority as the leader of the free world in 1945. Associated with the resurgence of the Berlin syndrome in the post-Cold War is the subtle revalidation of a logic of neo-colonial re-appropriation of the prized estates in Africa and the consolidation in the post-Cold War of neo-colonial claims of national pre carre and exclusive orbits of influence by former colonial forces in Africa. The important change for Africa is the ascendance of realism, neo-conservatism and the relative decline of the messianic impulses of the United States. Accordingly, the United States has joined the race, even if in very nuanced stances. Rather than reassert its historic repudiation of this ugly resurgence of the Berlin mindset, the new United States realism, whether under the leadership of a liberal or a neo-conservative administration, has meant it aggressively promoting its national interests where they do not converge with any of the traditional neo-colonial forces and at the same time conniving with these same forces when deemed strategic to do so. This United States thus does deals to sacrifice its lesser values in Africa, if greater American national interests are thereby protected. Africa has therefore remained a pawn on this systemic chessboard. The practical implication of this is the unfortunate continuity of the discounted interests of Africa across the board. Therefore, the African security landscape is principally characterised by interventions of extra-African forces before and since our flag independence. This has been accentuated in the post-Cold War, but with a twist as France, the entrenched hegemonic force in Africa, and the United States of America engage in open competition for the control of the destiny of Africa. [caption id="attachment_11936" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •U.S Africa Command established by the U.S in Africa in 2007[/caption] The clashing interests and collaborative connivance of the major external elite forces are projected in their comprehensive interventions on the continent. The overt competition between the United States and France are expressed in the refurbishment and the transformations in the global security landscape in the last two decades have been phenomenal. Notwithstanding a lack of common universal understanding regarding the structure of the post-Cold War global system; whether the systemic structure is multipolar or a hegemonic pax-American age, strategic interaction in the post-Cold War, sign-posted by the events of 9/11, is generally appreciated as increasingly complex by the day, more uncertain, more turbulent and characterised by violent engagements of a myriad of non-state forces across the globe who are impacting on the constantly evolving strategic landscape confronting both the dominant state actors as well as second and third rank elements of the global system. These new forces, mobilised by fundamentalist ideo-religious visions that are driven by passion more potent than that of secular ideology, have become central to the contemporaneous chapter of the grand narratives of the evolution of human society. They have generated greater animosity than the historic antagonism associated with the struggle of the secular theologies of capitalism and communism. They have thus thrust themselves as the crucial factors impinging strategic policy formulation at all levels. These structural transformations in the global system are further compounded in Africa by the profound changes across a broad spectrum of factors that impact power and therefore continentalpolicy calculus since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa. The end of the Cold War critically altered the overarching political environment for elite and hegemonic forces operating in Africa. The altered global environment in the post-Cold War enabled the reinstatement of an 1884 Berlin syndrome; a syndrome that was de-validated by the prostrate helplessness of Europe after WWII and the ascendance of the messianic impulses of the United States and its transcendental moral authority as the leader of the free world in 1945. Associated with the resurgence of the Berlin syndrome in the post-Cold War is the subtle revalidation of a logic of neo-colonial re-appropriation of the prized estates in Africa and the consolidation in the post-Cold War of neo-colonial claims of national pre carre and exclusive orbits of influence by former colonial forces in Africa. The important change for Africa is the ascendance of realism, neo-conservatism and the relative decline of the messianic impulses of the United States. Accordingly, the United States has joined the race, even if in very nuanced stances. Rather than reassert its historic repudiation of this ugly resurgence of the Berlin mindset, the new United States realism, whether under the leadership of a liberal or a neo-conservative administration, has meant it aggressively promoting its national interests where they do not converge with any of the traditional neo-colonial forces and at the same time conniving with these same forces when deemed strategic to do so. This United States thus does deals to sacrifice its lesser values in Africa, if greater American national interests are thereby protected. Africa has therefore remained a pawn on this systemic chessboard. The practical implication of this is the unfortunate continuity of the discounted interests of Africa across the board. Therefore, the African security landscape is principally characterised by interventions of extra-African forces before and since our flag independence. This has been accentuated in the post-Cold War, but with a twist as France, the entrenched hegemonic force in Africa, and the United States of America engage in open competition for the control of the destiny of Africa. The clashing interests and collaborative connivance of the major external elite forces are projected in their comprehensive interventions on the continent. The overt competition between the United States and France are expressed in the refurbishment and establishment of their direct military presences on the continent, often competing and also collaborative engagement in the management of the conflicts, including in the handling of the challenge of asymmetric wars in Sahelo–Sahara, in the Senegalese basin, and in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, where the Boko Haram has gained global attention as well as in Mali, Libya, among others. These conflicts provide the rationale or rationalisations for the intensification of a new scramble for Africa by the United States and France. On 19-21 February 2003, French President Jacques Chirac hosted a Paris summit of African heads of state, entitled: “Africa and France, Together in a New Partnership.” Many countries traditionally considered outside France’s sphere of influence were invited by President Chirac. Only President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire refused to come or send a high-level delegation. The global Franco-American rivalry that dominated the summit led to public recrimination between Rwandan President Paul Kagame, aligned with the US, and Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade supporting France. Attacking the US, Chirac proposed cutting subsidies of First World agricultural exports to African countries. The British press, suspicious of France’s African policy, reacted hysterically to that summit. The Financial Times of London complained that Chirac had “kidnapped European policy” on Africa. [caption id="attachment_11933" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •Chirac: Hosted the Paris summit entitled ‘Africa and France[/caption] A decade after, on 6 and 7 December, 2013, France convoked 40 African heads of state to the Elysee Summit for Peace and Security in Africa in Paris. The summit was strategically timed as France prepared to launch its second military intervention in the continent in the year. Having undermined South Africa’s naïve intervention in the Central African Republic, CAR, France has increased its force to at least 1,000 soldiers in the country. France’s CAR intervention came at the end of a major French military operation in Mali, which was ostensibly motivated by the need to liberate the country from jihadist control. Meanwhile, France has upgraded its base in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, and will increase its rapid deployment force permanently stationed there to over 4000 in 2014. For its part, the United States established the United States Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM) that began initial operations on 1 October, 2007. AFRICOM officially became an independent command on 1 October, 2008. It is one of six geographic combatant commands and is responsible for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organisations. For effective operations, AFRCOM plans to relocate its headquarters from Germany to Africa. AFRICOM was active in Libya, working along with France, but with completely different goals, as Italy was shunted aside. In the first week of August, 2014, leaders from 50 African states attended a three-day summit at the White House. Although, the official line is that the African summit was to focus on trade and investments, a major thrust was to explore the role of the United States in curbing rising Islamist violence on the continent. Analysts note the context that the United States summit remained concerned about efforts by (international) terrorist groups to gain a foothold in Africa. At the same time, this largest ever gathering of African leaders in Washington is interpreted as “elevating our engagement” with a continent increasingly under China’s influence. Some perceive that US interests in Africa may not also be unrelated to perceived threat posed by the emergence of the BRICS coupled with fears that the dollar will no longer serve as the dominant currency for international trade. The deployment of over 3000 non–combat troops by the United States to fight Ebola in Liberia, its historic friend on this side, is part of the larger scheme of projecting the soft aspect of America’s sharp power to send a strong signal to Paris. Paris is in charge in the fight against Ebola in Conakry. Great Britain last week convened an international conference on fighting Ebola in Sierra Leone. For Nigeria, a second significant structural realignment in Africa and crucial determinant for foreign and security policy making is the rise of many centres of power within Africa. From 1960 to the fall of apartheid, the credible local champion in black Africa was Nigeria. Although on the wrong side of history on what has proven to be a horrendous watershed 1963 mistake of the triumph of the retrogressive Monrovia bloc over the progressive Casablanca group on the future of Africa, Nigeria later emerged as the pivot of progressive forces in Africa. The conservative actors were led by neo-cololonial proxies such as Houphouet Boigny and Liberia’s William Tubman acting to protect the interests of the United States. The former floated structures such as the Conseil de l’Entente (“Council of Accord” or “Council of Understanding”) basically to impede regional integration and emancipatory initiatives such as unconditional support for liberation insurgencies all over Africa. Houphouet Boigny’s Cote d’Ivoire frustrated the potentially first armed liberation movement in West Africa – FLING – to begin the armed insurrection against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea Bissau. It took the defiant Sekou Toure to provide the necessary resources, human, material and materiel, for Amilcar Cabral to launch one of Africa’s historic foremost progressive revolutions in the Pan Africa Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verdes, PAIGC. [caption id="attachment_11931" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •Boigny: Frustrated Guinea Bissau’s armed struggle against Portugal[/caption] Houphouet Boigny and diminutive former French secret agent, Omar Bongo, then leading Gabon, were France’s African point men in the attempt to dismember Nigeria. Nigeria, after that trial by ordeal, developed the resources, human and material, to pursue its messianic role of leading anti-apartheid forces in Africa. Nigeria survived to lead the anti-apartheid struggle to a final success and managed to galvanise progressive forces in its sub-region to build a futuristic economic community that has had constructive political impact in conflict management in West Africa. ECOWAS, if the unceasing difficult undercurrent of Francophone opposition is astutely managed, should prove a big asset for the sub-region. It must be observed in this connection that Alassane Ouattara, the man responsible for separating Anglophones from Francophones in Cote d’Ivoire, as Prime Minister under the tutelage of an aging Ivorian president Boigny, has in his controversial reincarnation refloated the notorious Conseil de Entente that is exclusive to Francophones instead of pursuing the full integration of the West Africa sub-region across colonial lines. Reconfigurations in the global and continental strategic landscape and emerging realignment of forces in Africa, all against the background of the resurgence of the 1884 Berlin syndrome, call for a realistic appraisal of policy not only in Nigeria, but for all African state actors with the credentials to be taken seriously in capitals that matter in the world.Meanwhile, China has abandoned the fringes and joined the fray on Africa with its own moral and ethical issues.As earlier noted, the continuing ascendance of France’s profile and the consolidation of its historic status as the hegemon of Africa’s security landscape remains a continental challenge. This situation was especially uncontested in West and Central Africa, until South Africa and Angola called its bluff on the Ivorian crisis, while Nigeria dropped the ball. This last singular failure threatened Nigeria’s front line role in the management of strategic challenges even in the West Africa sub-region. [caption id="attachment_11932" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •Bongo: The agent of France to dismember Nigeria[/caption] The interplay of these factors has been further aided by the unsalutary evolution in Nigeria’s domestic political processes. This includes the perceived political mismanagement of and, in actuality, the not unexpected operational challenges posed by the asymmetric character of the confrontation with the Boko Haram insurgency. These changed realities impose on Nigeria a need torealign its broad distillation of thoughts or grand strategy or whatever ideas direct its engagements with its immediate environment and the world at large to advance its considered fundamental interests and stakes in the system. Deconstructing one myth is important at this point. In the Ivorian crisis, Nigeria deluded itself into believing that Abidjan was in its supposed area of major influence from which other power brokers in Africa were barred. Yet, its controversial policy was bewildering to all perceptive and informed Africanist policy analysts. Late in navigating the complex undercurrents of the crisis, Ghana’s John Arthur Mills backed out of the Nigerian faux pax. Gambia balked early and Angola, among others, lined behind Pretoria in the ultimately failed attempt to redeem Africa from a French project to reinstate a proxy in its old pre-carre. With France withdrawing an earlier promise to support South Africa against Nigeria in the bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council and Obama’s United States changing the principled support of the Bush administration for the nationalist Laurent Gbagbo, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa later crawled to the Elysee to control the damage done to relations with France. [caption id="attachment_11935" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Obama: His country competes with France in the new scramble for Africa[/caption] Despite all the touting of concern for democratic deepening in Africa, Obama was prepared to trade George Bush’s American principled support, with a whiff of anti-France sentiment, for neo-nationalist Cote d’Ivoire, for a surreal democratic cause in Cote d’Ivoire to gain the sympathy of Sarkozy’s France in fulfilling his (Obama’s) campaign promise to broaden the coalition base in Iraq and to enhance the participation of NATO allies in Afghanistan. He traded Africa for his domestic political agenda. Obama’s turnaround of US policy in Cote d’Ivoire underlines the strange pathology of democratic advocacy of the West in the Third World, especially in Africa without much serious quid pro quo to offer. In this purview, the validating instrument of western democracy has been compromised not by the intrinsic value of the substantive tenets of this governance paradigm, but by the self-appointed external gendarmerie of global democracy that have instrumentalised democratic praxis as a tool for continued hegemonic control. It is in the context of this strategic appropriation that Naom Chomsky describes the western yearning for democracy in the Third World as a bad joke. He advances western democratic promotion has a funny history because of the schizophrenia of the West. He affirms that the West supports democracy only if it conforms with certain strategic and economic interests of the western validators. What emerges here is that Nigeria never experienced a hegemony, even in West Africa, even if it played critical roles in processes that positively impacted the trajectory of the political history of the continent. Meanwhile, changing circumstances portend significant implications for the projection of the character of Nigeria’s interaction with elite forces in Africa and the hegemons of the global system on Africa.These include the deterioration, relative to Nigeria, of the overall balance of power, resulting from, among other reasons, remarkable failure of Nigeria to advance technologically whether for peaceful or military ends, the rise of many centres of influence in Africa and significantly the emergence of aspiring continental and regional powers with demonstrated convergence in their broad afro-renaissant vision. The emergence of this group of loosely policy-affiliated states, not alliance, has bifurcated the continental strategic landscape between a predictable constellation of progressive Africanist/renaissant states not led by Nigeria and a still conservative France led proxy Francophone states to which Nigeria has gravitated as an appendage. Nigeria’s readings of developments in its the sub-region and continentally, evaluated on the basis of policy and the character of its engagements, are sadly indicative of a dearth of sophistication in strategic policy formulation and articulation. Despite the often ludicrous rationalisations to the contrary, these demonstrated policy deficits, including Nigeria’s strategically novitiate decision to lead the campaign for the reelection of another French stooge, Jean Ping, as President of the African Union Commission, appear to be directly linked to an increasing loss of confidence in the leadership of the country in African affairs among progressive forces. The structure of the final tally of that elections and the fact that Nigeria’s candidature for the office of Commissioner for Political Affairs of the AU was salvaged by Francophone solidarity clearly indicated that progressive forces had decided to align their sentiments in favour of a South Africa that had rightfully decided to sidestep an informal protocol to safeguard the long term interests of continental organisation and Africa. In the perspective of the progressives, the constellation of renaissant African states who sought a compromise on the way forward in the so-called revolutionary ousting of Libyan strongman Muammar Gadafi from power got it very right. Nigeria was on a different tangent under the misguided notion of enthroning democracy in Tripoli. The outcome of the western orchestrated democracy in Libya is out for all to see.Nigeria’s posture in Libya was a semblance of validation from a key Africa constituency for the West’s self-serving strategic interventions in Libya. Europe and America were lifting oil from Benghazi before the last bullet was fired in Libya. Africa has ended up with a not unavoidable lose-lose scenario in that distressed, agonising and slowly dying country. Nigeria was a direct facilitator of this sad situation. The consequences of the manner of the fall of Gaddafi are glaring enough in the Sahelo-Sahara and possibly in the fates of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in the terrorist insurgency of Boko Haram. The military debacle on Boko Haram is also revealing of the prevailing dearth of strategic thinking in Nigeria’s security and foreign policy. Strategic thinking must begin with clearly defined inviolable national interests, understanding of the environment, a good appreciation of resources and assets available as well as limitations, anda careful delineation of the geographical orbit of the most significance for the protection of these interests. Strategic thinking is also how to build a credible reach, in the geo-physical sense, and ensure integrity in implementation of the defined substantive interests and values central to policy. Geo-physical reach is closely linked to secured technological resources, including material and the human factor, defined as capacity. If Nigeria has no capacity to airlift its troops or mobilise its navy in a timely fashion to Bissau for key operational purposes, it has no credible claim to marking Bissau on the map as located in its zone of influence. It is the bottom line, even though we also recognise burden sharing in strategic and collaborative ventures such as the United States providing airlifts for specified French operations in Africa, where their interests converge. China is a global power because, beyond the growth of its economy that has increased its stickiness for policy making and the assured muscle to impact the global value the US dollar, it finally developed a blue ocean navigating fleet. [caption id="attachment_11938" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •Zuma: South Africa and Nigeria must cooperate to become the pivot to advance the African vision[/caption] Against this background, the emerged policy formulation process must determine the balance in the mix of diplomacy, soft power and conventional force in the engagement with these new forces. Given the global nexus that is amply reflected in the emergence of the Boko Haram as key policy drivers in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Tchad, the rise of such groups as the Al Shabaab in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania as well as the MUJAO in northern Mali, it is clear that strategic policy formulation in Nigeria has to be sensitive to the dangerous transformation in the global security landscape. But it must also respect the profound structural continuities and changes in Africa. The conceptual framework of our foreign and security requires constant review and reevaluation. In the past, Professor Gambari brilliantly floated the concept of concentric zones, by which Nigeria conceptually calibrated the intensity of its expected policy responses to developments in the various zones located in the concentric rings. The circles were often defined in terms of geophysical proximity to Nigeria. In actuality, in the then prevailing strategic layout, the concept of concentric zones and afrocentricity, as substantive strategic focus of policy, were theoretical paradigms of the interests and values to which Nigeria was prepared in a calibrated manner to stake our resources. But Nigeria was realistic about the constraints posed by the extant configuration in the sub region that shaped the practical application of the concentric layout. For, we were constrained in the sub-region by the hegemonic stakes of France, instigating its proxies in Houphouet Boigny’s Cote d’Ivoire to derail the poster child of the success of Anglophone West Africa ECOWAS project. From this longitudinal span, by default Nigeria missed a centennial opportunity to reconfigure the strategic layout by helping to oust the nationalist and Africanist Laurent Gbagbo administration from Abidjan. The opening to transcend the contrived division of West Africa as Francophone, Lusophone or Anglophone through this potential singular historic strategic turnaround was lost on policy wonks in Abuja. As a result, France has reinforced its military base 43rd BIMA in Cote d’Ivoire and reinforced its intelligence capacity in that country into a vast network to cover much of Africa, but certainly to overwhelm West Africa and contain the incursions of the United States. Mali would be under firm grip of France for some time. Paul Biya’s Cameroun is waiting in the wings for Nigeria to falter. France again is embroiled with Portugal in the instability in Guinea Bissau to keep the tired Lusophone country under its orbit through its continued membership of the CFA zone. Technologically, it is clear that Nigeria is faced with serious limitations if we cannot produce enough bullets and basic guns to fight a terrorist insurgency. This is despite the unveiling of an unmanned drone by the Nigerian Air Force recently. The open rebuff of our pleadings to weapons producing countries to help us salvage our image and fight the Boko Haram has seen our reputation plummet as a sovereign state. We cannot fight our battles on our own steam and terms. We entered into virtual and fruitless international receivership and after taking sides against Russia in the troubles in Ukraine. Next we found ourselves in Moscow to solicit for arms. While we are at this, the arms industry announced a revolutionary new South African-designed and developed aircraft that is destined for a significant role in a wide range of civilian and military tasks around the world. The Advanced High-Performance Reconnaissance Light Aircraft, AHRLAC, took the aviation market by storm, challenging dominant Western manufacturers with its multi-role applications, low acquisition cost, reduced requirement for maintenance support and extensive operational capabilities. The brochure cites that the South African AHRLAC offers a highly flexible form of mission configurable payload system which enables it to be transformed quickly between operational roles. It can stay in the air for more than seven hours, making it the ideal solution for patrolling large land areas, borders and oceans. It can fly 4000 miles without refuelling. The two-crew aircraft can carry out a wide range of operations including surveillance, policing, border/coastal patrol and anti-smuggling; armed patrol and counter insurgency operations; disaster relief and emergency supply to remote areas; and intelligence gathering. [caption id="attachment_11937" align="aligncenter" width="213"] •US doctors like Dr Bratley treating Ebola patients in Liberia[/caption] By contrast, in 2014, the Nigerian Defence Industries continues to operate the ordnance factories for the manufacture and supply of arms and ammunition as well as inspecting, testing and recommending ordnance materiel intended for use by the Armed Forces and other security organisations while using the excess capacity to support the development of local industries. The national defence industry project has failed so we smuggle $9.3 million to South Africa to buy weapons, if the official story line is to be believed. Importantly, we got caught and humiliated. As anecdotal as these may seem, our inability to manufacture mere bullets to equip our forces that has led to mutinies and the massive gaps in our technological capacities vis-a vis other leading forces in Africa provide solid indicators that we are lacking in the most critical dimension of instruments available to pursue national foreign and security policy. Ultimately, sharp power still triumphs. Away from the realms of what experts have termed sharp or military power, both South Africa and Nigeria would seem to be at par on other dimension of power. Nigeria may seem to have an edge in black Africa when it comes to economic or sticky power. Although the rebased figures put Nigeria ahead on absolute economic indices, sticky power refers more to the capacity of the economy to lure others to participate in it. This is what Russell Walter Mead describes as the pleasing scent that draws an insect towards its sap. South Africa has more diversified range of exports, compared to Nigeria’s mainly oil-derived national resource base. Yet, both have a capacity through their economies to integrate, to some measure, major capitals who would be sympathetic figures or who’ll be constrained by their economic links to pursue very untoward policy that may be injurious to their economic interests. This would mean that the real cost of an injurious policy stand by France against Nigeria would be measured in terms of the value of investments at stake and the loss of market open to French businesses in the country. When South Africa and Nigeria compare notes and develop common policies in relation to Africa, they up the stakes for extra African powers who may be tempted to challenge their jointly held policies. Finally, on the projection of soft power or sweet power, the jury is still out. Yet, Nigeria would appear to evoke mixed feelings. While its credentials as a generous nation that has contributed to the ultimate liberation of Africa is accepted by all objective commentators, it is by no means given that this has translated into goodwill across the social spectrum throughout the continent. Nollywood is on the international continent’s entertainment radar. Yet, a closer look suggests a need for greater refinement of the images and the penchant to demonise tradition put most of its products as local antennas of hypocritical western evangelical missions in Africa. Meanwhile, what is the proportion of the foreign student component in the student population in Nigeria’s tertiary institutions? How many budding African intellectuals, both young and old, do Nigerian academies attract? What proportion of research in Nigeria is dedicated African-related issues and policy? How many Nigerians speak Swahili, French, Portuguese, or Arabic? Given its historic role in the political emancipation of Africa, it is natural for Nigeria to hunger for the perpetuation of its glorious moments under the sun. The snag is that the sun has shifted place and the shadow is growing long. There is no one centre of gravity in Africa today. And it is not desirable. For a new post-Apartheid South Africa still cutting its teeth in the slippery international terrain, it is tempting to press its technological and economic advantages over the rest of Africa. It also has the advantage of being an immediate post-colonial state with a political elite possessing such heightened degree of political consciousness that is unprecedented on the continent. Hopefully some of its recent escapades in Cote d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic should inform it of the complexities of international engagements even in Africa. Nigeria, and in particular with South Africa, have to come to terms with certain sharp realities that impose on them the imperatives to painfully abjure the temptation or the emerging tendency to assert exclusive zones of influence in Africa or pursue the illusion of going it all alone in a leadership role in Africa. Such a project would be myopic and not practicable. Recent events in Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, in the Central African Republic and even in Nigeria provide signposts of the looming danger for Africa, should any of these two countries seek national egomaniacal projects resembling a sub-regional or continental exclusive zone of influence in the search for some nebulous pax Nigeriana or a pax Azania. This would be an exercise in futility with dire consequences for the holistic renaissance of black humanity. It is simply not a feasible option, in circumstances where the total coefficient of power of the ten strongest African states in relation to the cumulative system power and force is insignificant and inconsequential. All African states would continue to be minced dinner meat and beef steak for elite predatory states acting together as one. [caption id="attachment_11934" align="aligncenter" width="300"] •Jonathan: Needs to formulate a vibrant foreign policy[/caption] All said and down, Nigeria needs a creative new grand vision to direct foreign and security policy for the next 50 or so years. The suggestion is to realign and broaden the country’s earlier mainly politically focussed messianic vision and liberation mission by integrating its afrocentric thrust into the collective African renaissant project. African renaissance provides a template for a policy across avery wide plane of human endeavour, including foreign and security policies. As a collection of relatively weak states in a more complex and turbulent post-Cold War epoch, individual African states, Nigeria and South Africa inclusive, must band together, driven and bound by Africanist policy convergences, to be relevant especially on matters that touch on black humanity as a whole. It is projected that this constellation of progressive African forces would be, first, arrayed against a predictable circuit of African states that historically are led and have and continue to serve as willing proxies of extra African powers. More importantly, the progressive African constellation would mobilise as the bulwark against the divide and rule strategy of Africa’s traditional elite predatory state actors who are threatened by the prospect of a truly emancipated Africa. Nigeria and South Africa must become the pivot of, to modify Prof Bolaji Akinyemi’s idea, a Concert of Renaissant African States (CRAS) as an informal consultative platform to advance Africas’s renaissant vision. To achieve this objective, Nigeria must revitalise its structures, including strengthening potential value added of its personnel, in a broad realm of critical substantive areas to enhance critical strategic thinking in its foreign and security policy formulation. Nigeria must reject outmoded and pretentious thinking of sub-regional or continental ascendance or domination as a policy objective. Such a policy goal is neither feasible nor desirable in the evolved global strategic landscape at all of levels of strategic intercourse: sub-regional, continental and systemic. Even the touted hegemon of the global system with almost infinite panoply of instrumentsat its disposal is hard put to maintain its global hegemony. Nigeria should put greater emphasis on collaborating in building new and strengthening the integrity of existing sub-regional and continental structures and mechanisms as the final instruments of Africanist policy that converges with meeting the challenge of defeating powerful extra African powers determined to keep the continent back. African continental bodies, exemplified by the African Union, must be enabled to provide robust as well as qualitative leadership in the frontlines of Africa’s engagement with the world. Global organisations of all and every hue must occupy a second or third rung against preeminent continental structures. The best of Africa should be uploaded on the African Union as the foremost vehicle of African emancipation. Nigeria can provide leadership in jettisoning archaic visions and in concretising in its policy the emergence of a truly renaissant Africa.