Col Abubakar Umar Dangiwa

By Abubakar Dangiwa Umar

Once at the venue, the General would reveal to them the decision of the Armed Forces to the effect that Prof. Nwosu was to formally announce the results and as we had already known, Abiola would be sworn in. The election tribunal already in place would entertain any petitions from aggrieved parties. I would make the first coup broadcast and General Abacha would follow later.

A team of senior officers headed by Gen. Useni, who was not involved in our plot was to go to Abuja and break the news to IBB. On Sunday, I left Lagos for Ibadan to ascertain 242 Reconnaissance Battalion state of readiness. The CO, retired Col. M.S Shehu, a fine officer, was fully ready. I drove back to Bauchi through Jos on Monday.

On Friday 2 July, I left for Lagos.

I held meetings with some officers, including Col Jaafaru Isa, Dauda Komo etc., they showed great enthusiasm for the project as they believed like many other officers that it was an honourable task. We also met with Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe at No 7 Raymond Njoku Road Ikoyi later that day. Baba Gana was monitoring some of our activities since Abiola was out of the country.

On Saturday 10 July, 1 had a meeting with Gen. Abacha around midday. He informed me that he was in touch with MKO and he assured him that things were moving according to plan. He was also in touch with Kingibe, he had already summoned all the GOCs to Lagos and didn’t anticipate any problems. The Sunday meeting was going to hold at his guest house. He and Gen. Diya were also coming to the final coordinating meeting at 9pm at Gen. David Mark’s guest house in Park View, Ikoyi, he said. He asked if the units were ready and I confirmed so.

Again I met Generals Bamaiyi, Onoja and Ahmed Abdullahi waiting as I left Abacha in his inner sitting room. Only Abdullahi was part of our group. Around 8.45pm, I arrived Gen. Mark’s guest house, in company of Col. Sambo. We met Gwadabe, David Mark and a few others. Abacha, Diya and Abdullahi did not turn up. Instead, David Mark presided.

We went over the plan. As the meeting progressed, one of the officers asked me what appointment I was interested in, in the government that was to be formed. I was shocked at this. When I asked which government, he told me that Gen. Abacha had pleaded that he be allowed to take over as Head of State! He would stay for about 6 months to help purge the military and judiciary before handing over to Abiola. As can be imagined, I was so disgusted as were some of the officers present. I immediately asked the chairman, to allow us to go on recess and reconvene around l am. To which he agreed.

I dashed to Gen. Diya’s house at Alexander Avenue. He was all alone. I asked why he was not at the meeting and he just looked blank. Inquired from him if he knew of Abacha’s request and he said to me, “Dangiwa I know you are sincere but I am afraid Gen. Abacha has a hidden agenda.” And what did he think of the request? He said he thought it would not work. I then told him that I was going to see Gen. Abacha and he should also meet with him later to assure him that most of the officers involved would not accept this new plan. I left him a very worried and evidently confused person.

I met Gen. Abacha around 11pm. He asked if the meeting was over and I told him that we had to break because of the new development. He pretended not to know what I was talking about. When I narrated the message the officer passed on to us, I could read the embarrassment written all over his face. He tried to convince me that it was the opinion of some of the officers who thought that Abiola’s government would face serious challenges from the military and judiciary and that it would be very risky to leave him at their mercy.

The officers according to him were also apprehensive of their own survival in the event that Abiola’s government got toppled, which according to credible security reports, was very likely. He pleaded with me to show flexibility. I was incredulous, horrified you could say.

I disagreed outright with his submission and warned him of the terrible consequences of this course of action.

I had on all the occasions of our meetings reminded the group that Nigerians would not accept this annulment and were bound to oppose it vehemently. There had been riots earlier and what we were experiencing was a prelude to very violent uprising particularly in the South West.

The international community had condemned the annulment and was planning to impose sanctions. I reminded Abacha of all those and pleaded with him to save Nigeria from collapse. I finally apprised him of the difficulties he would face from members of the armed forces who would rather have Abiola as C-in-C than he. This last observation may not have gone down well with him when he attempted to blackmail me.

He pointed out that it was already belated and that we had gone so far in the coup plot that if we were to postpone it or call it off, there would be leakage and IBB would round us up. I agreed with him and pleaded with him one more time to stand on the side of truth and justice by sticking to the original plan, which envisaged a hand over to Abiola.

Blind ambition for power without purpose or with the wrong purpose had gripped Abacha. He was unyielding. With this, I shocked him with the news that I was out of the plot. He asked how and I informed him that I was on my way to tell the COs to stand down. I left and headed to the Lagoon Restaurant where I had earlier ordered for take-away snacks, envisaging that I was going to be late.

Right behind me when I arrived at the Lagoon was Gen. Ahmed Abdullahi. I was not expecting him, so I thought he was on a mission to arrest me. I paid the usual compliments to a senior officer and asked what his mission was. He said he was late for the meeting but was informed of what had transpired and expressed his regrets that the original plan was altered. I praised him for his moral courage and assured him that I was on my way to Ikeja to abort the plot. He left. I collected my snacks and made my way to 245 Reconnaissance Battalion. I met the CO in his office. I briefed him on the unfortunate development.

He was also shocked and agreed that we should not attempt anything against IBB government unless it was to reverse the annulment. We got in touch with the other officers who were waiting for instructions and asked them to stand down. Once this was sorted out, I asked Col. Isa to go and inform the group that we had decided to quit on account of change of the plan by Gen. Abacha. The plan was therefore aborted.

I am not sure but I cannot rule out the possibility that IBB picked some signals of our move. I am not sure if that contributed to his decision to announce the creation of an Interim National Government (ING) on 31 July 1993 to be headed by Chief Earnest

Shonekan. In that announcement, he indicated his plan to step aside on 27 August, 1993, the day the new government would be inaugurated. That decision had a calming effect on the resolve of those Nigerians who were sworn to contest the June 12 annulment even if it meant setting the country ablaze. But it was a case of suspended animation. It was evident that this group would not accept the ING as a legitimate alternative. I believe that the creation of that government was a step in the wrong direction.

My hope was for NDSC to realize its mistake in the annulment, which had effectively pushed Nigeria to the precipice. But positions had unfortunately hardened. We found ourselves dealing with Generals who were more concerned about winning the war of nerves with the growing opposition. The ING solution was the only face saving concession they could make. De-annulment was tantamount to accepting defeat. The government had pledged never to accept being chased out of power whenever it was challenged for causing time-buying delays in the prosecution of its transition programme. The ING was doomed from conception. It was bound to fail.

Just before IBB announced his decision to step aside, Gen. Abacha made one more attempt to overthrow his regime. Unknown to some of us, he had created another group and recruited some of our members. It was, however, difficult for him to execute his coup undetected by us. I don’t believe Abacha contacted any of the GOCs in his latest plot. The reconnaissance units had been stood down but their COs were instructed to await further instructions as regards a new date. General Abdulsalami and I were to leave for the quarterly inspection visit to Newcastle, England to assess the progress being made by Vickers, which was manufacturing main battle tanks for the Nigerian Army.

I had earlier requested that my deputy should substitute me for this trip but Gen. Abacha detected this and insisted that I should go.

Gen. Abdulsami, Brig. Gen. Garba Abdulkardir, Mr. Onoja (a director at the Ministry of Defence) and I were at the airport for the check-in when word came that government had decided to cancel the trip, in its reaction to the sanctions imposed on Nigeria by the British government on account of the annulment of the June 12 election.

I returned to the Bauchi State Liaison office in Victoria Island around 8.30pm on that Saturday night, 24 July 1993. Barely 30 minutes later, CO 245 Reconnaissance Battalion, Col. Isa arrived. His mission was to confirm the latest instruction from Gen. Abacha, In a nutshell, his unit was instructed to participate in a coup that was to take place the next morning 25 July. He was told that I had left for the UK but that I was aware of the operation. He was there to confirm that I had indeed left as my flight was scheduled to depart at midnight. I denied any knowledge of the plan. I asked him to disregard the instructions and I promised to get back to him after consultations with some members of the group