Time for Nigeria to stand up for Africa

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• It must also be said that the disingenuity and partisanship of Mr Lakemfa is reflected too in his portrayal of the events that recently transpired in Senegal during the joint ECA-AUC Annual Ministerial Conference: a highly significant, technical conference aimed at tackling some of Africa's most pressing needs; the contempt for which was not, in fact, reflected by Morocco's legitimate objection to the presence of the so-called SADR, but by the venom and vigour displayed by Algeria and her allies in defending the participation of this illegitimate entity. Indeed, the ECA is a regional commission of the UN, for which the so-called SADR (a stateless AU "member-state") is not a member. It was thus incumbent upon the Moroccan authorities--the guarantors of Morocco's national unity and territorial integrity--to raise, as within her legal right, an objection to the presence of this non-member entity at a UN forum (a situation which would set a dangerous precedent with a number of ramifications). In this regard, the UN rules and regulations are well established. However, Algeria--backed by its traditional African allies, for whom rules mean little--charged that the so-called SADR was an AU member and therefore could not be excluded from a joint conference, yet, the superiority of the UN--the highest international authority--is patently clear in this mater. Unconcerned, Algeria and her allies continued to flex their muscles: not limiting their concerns to verbal protests and insults, but threatening to walkout altogether if the so-called SADR was excluded; a reprehensible bully tactic that not only displayed a flagrant disregard for established UN laws, but revealed the utter contempt these so-called heavy weight countries have for actually defending and serving the interests of African peoples. Fortunately, their schemes were foiled and the ECA legal advisor made clear that, due to the objection raised by Morocco, the commission would not be able to participate in the meeting if the so-called SADR were to take a seat; the decision was therefore taken to suspend the meeting until another date because Algeria and her allies upheld their threat to withdraw. Is Morocco then really to blame? The necessity upon her to raise an objection to the presence of this particular non-UN-member is apparent to any informed and impartial mind; the question, however, that should be asked is why Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, et al, prioritised the seating--at an immensely technical and crucial conference--of an illegitimate, factually non-existent and irrelevant entity (without even the requisite experts, skills, qualifications or know-how to have made any serious contributions) ahead of the interests of African people and specifically, making strides toward the improvement of Africa's growth, inequality and unemployment! Perhaps one only needs to look at the downward spiral South Africa is experiencing and the dire straits both fossil-fuel rich Algeria and Nigeria find themselves in (never mind the regrettable situation of Zimbabwe) to understand the disdainful nonchalance and political trolling demonstrated by the members of their delegations. Shame on them and shame on you, Mr Lakemfa!

• Morocco's relationship with the Sahara cannot, under any stretch of the imagination, be characterized as "colonial": There is neither a distinct ethnic nor geographic divide between Morocco and the territory or its population, who are quite properly speaking Moroccan! Moreover there is a shared history, language, culture, ethnicity and religion upon which they have been united since time immemorial, as well as comprehensive legal and political ties that prove the ancient Moroccanity of the Sahara. Equally, Morocco's relationship with the territory cannot be characterized as an "occupation". The law of belligerent occupation constitutes a segment of the jus in bello: a belligerent occupation cannot arise outside or independently of an international armed conflict (an inter-State war). Whereas 1. the Kingdom of Morocco did not re-establish itself in the Western Sahara territory through an armed conflict (of any kind); 2. the formal establishment of Morocco's presence and authority in the territory preceded the hostilities that subsequently developed in the region; which (if deemed strictly to have involved the Kingdom of Morocco (and the Republic of Mauritania) on the one side and the POLISARIO Front--non-State actor--on the other) cannot even objectively be said to be international in character via categorization as a war of national liberation: Morocco's administration is neither "colonial and alien" nor is it "racist". In point of fact, Morocco is under no prima facie obligation, pursuant to UNGA resolution 1541(XV), to transmit information on the territory under Article 73e of the U.N. Charter. In any case, if certain and specific laws of international armed conflict were at all applicable to events that transpired in the territory following the re-establishment of Morocco's presence, it is absolutely clear--by both the letter and spirit of the law--that the law of occupation is not one of them. Indeed, Morocco's presence was accomplished by the genuine, valid, explicit and internationally recognised consent of the then legal regime, the Kingdom of Spain, thus, right off the bat, making the law of occupation inapplicable. This consent was effectuated by virtue of the Madrid Accords of 14 November 1975: providing for the termination of the Spanish presence in the territory--its decolonization--by 28 February 1976 "at the latest" and, to that end, the establishment of an interim administration to which Spain transferred all responsibilities and powers. Accordingly, in the immediate wake of the agreement entering into force, the Kingdom of Morocco began--by the powers invested in it--to re-establish control over the territory; steadily appointing governors and prefects, and gradually moving forces into the territory--entering Laayoune (El Aaiun; capital of Saquia el Hamra and the administrative capital of the entire territory) on 11 December 1975 and Dakhla (Villa Cisneros; capital of Rio de Oro) on 11 January 1976--in conjunction with the gradual withdrawal of Spanish forces (the last of whom were known to have left the territory on 12 January 1976). Negotiations leading to the Madrid Agreement were entered into within the framework of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, pursuant to UNSC resolution 377 of 22 October 1975; a text of which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on 18 November in accordance with article 102 of the U.N. Charter. Indeed, the agreement was formally registered at the U.N., document S/11880, Annex III. The international recognition and legitimacy of the Madrid Accords--as well as the process of its agreement--was further confirmed by UNGA resolution 3458(XXX)B on 10 December 1975 after the General Assembly gathered precisely to discuss whether or not the agreement breached any of the U.N. resolutions relating to the territory or Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. This point cannot be diminished, ignored or overlooked. Thus--even pretermitting Morocco's legitimate historical rights and legal ties to the territory--establishing the validity of Morocco's presence and authority. During the process of Spain's transfer of power, the Kingdom of Morocco was not confronted by spontaneous resistance (levee en masse) from the territory's population (in fact, Morocco can demonstrate huge popular support); but rather it was regrettably aggressed by foreign armed forces (namely Algerian) with the assistance of a pre-established and foreign-backed armed group, the POLISARIO Front, who were based and operating from outside the Western Sahara territory (in Algeria) and whose ranks up until late 1975 consisted of an insignificant number of persons before being heavily swelled by both collaborators of Spanish colonialism (defecting mostly from the Spanish Tropas Nomadas and Policia Territorial) and foreign nationals (persons originating from outside the territory in question, persons from unrelated Saharo-Sahelian nomadic/tribal groups and other mercenaries). Of course, no open declaration of war was made by Algeria, who predictably denied military involvement altogether (contradicted nonetheless by 1. the advanced and sophisticated weaponry used to assault Moroccan and Mauritanian targets (some of which operable only by specialists), 2. the scope and complexity of certain armed operations/raids (necessitating substantial logistical support and orchestration by a competent and superior High Command), 3. major clashes widely recognised to have involved Algerian troops (heavily-armed), over a hundred of whom were captured and twice as many killed (Algeria, tail between its legs, of course maintained--for the benefit of the gullible--that they were not present in the territory for belligerent purpose)); yet Algeria had overtly supplied extensive arms and set up extensive military training facilities for their puppet front (who would also go on to receive supplies, financing, and ideological and military training from foreign states such as Libya, Cuba, North Vietnam, Iran, East Germany and North Korea). In addition, Algeria also established both the POLISARIO Front military headquarters and population camps (surrounding the military HQ as a human-shield) at the disputed Algero-Moroccan frontier region of Tindouf in violation of the 1963 and 1964 Algero-Moroccan ceasefire accords (specifying a demilitarised zone encompassing the area) and, even more brazenly, in contravention of both Article 2(6) and Article 3(2) of the O.A.U. Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Moreover, Algeria explicitly threatened the use of force against Morocco prior to the Madrid Agreement (in response to Morocco's non-belligerent Green March) and continued to make veiled threats of direct military intervention in the aftermath of the Madrid Agreement. Regrettably, Algeria's unlawful, belligerent and treacherous policies in the Saharan affair were not orchestrated altogether in the spur of the moment: almost immediately after gaining independence in 1962, Algeria set about an anti-Moroccan campaign of hostility and provocation (including the sheltering, training and arming of left-wing opposition groups with the aim of exporting the Algerian revolution and toppling the monarchy, in fact, the Western Sahara was itself seen as a springboard to overthrowing the monarchy; support was also given to the Tunisian Youssefists with the aim of overthrowing the Bourgiba regime, it too being classed as reactionary by Algiers and other Nassrist states). In fact, even neglecting direct Algerian military intervention in the Western Sahara conflict, Algeria--picking up the neocolonial mantle from Spain--has still violated numerous bilateral agreements and international laws and obligations in its iniquitous endeavour to frustrate Morocco and to establish the POLISARIO Front: an armed guerrilla group that was and continues to be under the total patronage (outright control) of Algeria--a foreign interest hostile to both the Moroccan state and people--and which, moreover, did not openly pursue a separatist policy until after it began to receive this foreign backing--more than a year after the movements nominal formation (between 1973-1975 the POLISARIO Front had almost absolutely no significance socially, materially or politically)--hinting at its new objective only at its second congress held in August 1974 under the auspices of Algeria and Qaddafi's Libya; does this not tell its own tale? Regardless, it must be emphasised here that at no time during or prior to this period (viz. the implementation of the Madrid Agreement) was the POLISARIO Front recognised as a National Liberation Movement by the U.N. or even by the O.A.U.. Even if the UNGA would--owing to Algeria's political and diplomatic clout/blackmailing--many years later speak of the POLISARIO Front as "the representative of the people of the Western Sahara" in resolution 34/37 of 1979, reducing this status a year later (omitting the definite article) to simply a "representative of the people of the Western Sahara" in resolution 35/19 of 1980, neither resolution recognized the POLISARIO Front as a National Liberation Movement and no U.N. resolution or U.N. organ ever has. (The absence of this status within the U.N. was confirmed by the opinion of the U.N. office of legal affairs in 1980.) In respect of this fact (and again neglecting Algeria's direct intervention; even supposing the POLISARIO Fronts complete independence), how can anyone justify the POLISARIO Front's illegal use of force, their war-crimes, their terrorist attacks against civilians (including foreign nationals), their kidnapping and their forced displacement of populations (a process that began even before Morocco's re-entry) from inside and outside the Western Sahara territory (kept warehoused in militarized, indoctrination camps located on Algerian-occupied land); not to mention the POLISARIO Fronts unilateral declaration of a Sahrawi ARAB Democratic Republic (SADR): an Arab supremacist entity the POLISARIO Front and its foreign masters sought to establish by force of arms and without the slightest regard for the peaceful expression of the will of the population! Even if, for arguments sake, the POLISARIO Front guerrillas did enjoy or merit the status of a "National Liberation Movement" (they most certainly do not, neither legally nor morally, vis-à-vis Morocco), how can anyone justify their use of armed force (and equally their forced displacement of populations) in the midst of a legitimate, U.N. sanctioned decolonization process--at its most critical phase--and thus the POLISARIO's unquestionable attempts to torpedo/sabotage that very process! Without the acts of armed aggression a plebiscite would have likely occurred in the territory at that time--prior to Spain's scheduled withdrawal--but that possibility was unquestionably stripped away by Algerian military intervention and the insurgency of their puppet armed band of mercenaries, the POLISARIO Front. A point essentially recognised by the U.N. itself. Thus, in accordance with the decolonization process stipulated in the Madrid Accords and endorsed by UNGA resolution 3458(XXX)B and following also from the aforementioned resolution's direct reference to the application of self-determination "through free consultations", and further from UNGA resolution 3458(XXX)A--which dropped specific mention of a referendum in light of the 1975 Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara (which in fact recognised the legal ties between Morocco and the Western Sahara territory)--on 26 February 1975, a form of "free consultations" was carried out--in the presence of the Spanish assistant governor, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Rafel de Valdes Iglesias--and the provisions of the Accords were ratified, peacefully and openly, by the Jema'a (the 103-member Saharan legislative assembly established in 1967 as an effective means of consultation of the indigenous population, comprised entirely of Saharans including 40 tribal leaders elected by the Jema'a and 40 representatives elected by adult male suffrage), who had also approved the agreement in writing on 22 December 1975; the Jema'a having been recognised by the U.N. Mission to the territory as adequate representatives of the local population (A/10023/Add.5, Annex, at 41). The vote for reintegration, led by the Jema'a president, Khatri Ould Said Joumani, was unanimous and involved the majority (roughly two thirds) of its members (including 3 out of 5 Jema'a members who attended the 28 November 1975 Guelta Zemmur gathering under POLISARIO Front auspices). Following this, on the morning of 28 February 1976 a huge public ceremony was staged crowning the interim period in the city of Laayoune; in the presence of jubilant crowds and representatives of the Moroccan and Spanish authorities, the Spanish flag was removed from the building formerly housing the Spanish colonial regime and the Moroccan flag was raised in its place. The Madrid Declaration was also explicitly supported (prior to the adoption of resolution 3458(XXX)B) at the Fourth Committee by the General Secretaries of four established Saharan movements: FLU, MOREHOB, FLSRM and PUNS. Reunification was also supported by numerous other Saharan movements such as the FLS, AOSARIO and Mouvement du 21 Aout. Thus, as far as Morocco is concerned, the territory was effectively decolonised and reintegrated into the Moroccan Kingdom vis-a-vis the transfer of power, restoration of independence and return of usurped lands, all of which were further supported by acts of self-determination. Moreover, in addition to this initial act of external self-determination, each inhabitant of the territory--irrespective as to which part of the territory they lived in or belonged to--was given the right, within an indefinite time period, to choose between either Moroccan or Mauritanian nationality, thus giving added dimension to the decolonisation of the territory in accordance with the principles enshrined in UNGA resolution 1541(XV). On top of that, multiple elections have been held in the territory on the municipal, provincial and national levels. Indeed, the Saharan territories were de jure re-integrated into the Kingdom of Morocco without discrimination and organised on the same model as every other part of Morocco; likewise, the de jure re-integration of the territory's population was achieved within the framework of successive Moroccan constitutions, each of which, since 1972, have guaranteed the principles laid down by international accord for human rights (civic and political; economic, social and cultural). The population of the territory thus ENJOY FULL AND EQUAL Moroccan citizenship and have participated actively, democratically and in a continuous manner in Moroccan public life since reintegration, serving notably in the Moroccan military and the highest offices of government. Communal, provincial and national elections have continuously revealed high participation rates from the population of the Saharan provinces (as observed by international press and monitors) and all electoral consultations have been staged peacefully. Altogether testifying to the legitimacy of the Moroccan institutions and authorities installed in the Saharan provinces. It must also be emphasised here that the first elections--communal and parliamentary--took place in territory in 1976 and 1977 respectively, with huge public turnouts; and that these (nationwide) elections were widely recognised as being amongst the freest and fairest elections ever held in Africa at that time. In addition, the late King Hassan II publicly declared an amnesty for the POLISARIO Front guerrillas in the 1980s, advocating for both the return of natives and their involvement in the governing of Morocco. Numerous defections from the POLISARIO Front followed, including spectacular defections from co-founders and leading personalities (such as Omar Hadrami, Brahim Hakim, Mustapha Al Barazani, Bachir Dakhil, Ayoub Lahbib, Ahmadou Souilem, Gajmoula Bent Abbi, Hammati Rabbani, etc). The Algerian/POLISARIO Front-run gulags also suffered haemorrhaging with thousands (10,000-15,000) fleeing captivity throughout the decades to enter Morocco. In 2004, Morocco also created the Equity and Reconciliation Commission--the first Truth Committee in the Arabic-speaking world--to investigate abuses committed by the State between 1956 and 1999. Reparations amounting to $85million were distributed between approximately 16,000 individuals and further significant funds were allocated to entire communities through communal reparation programs. Many pro-separatist personalities have been directly recompensed by this initiative. Today, the democratic experience of Morocco is more mature and has been further consolidated at every level. (Morocco can rightly take pride in having one of the most active civil-societies and one of the most advanced constitutions in the Arabic-speaking world, as well as the most advanced political party and parliamentary system in the MENA area.) Indeed, Morocco is possessed of a government representing the whole of the people belonging to its territory without distinction. The exercise of this representative system, which provides for the right of choice, and which is recognised by the U.N. as a system of self-determination, is carried out in the Saharan territory in actual and legal conditions identical to every other part of Morocco. This ancient Kingdom thus stands out as one of the most politically stable and secure countries in Africa and the MENA area today and is internationally lauded as a pioneer and model developing country. Taking all this into account, Morocco is more than justified in considering that these facts constitute a series of elements that are more significant than a formal referendum, one which was moreover rendered impossible to orchestrate before Spain's pronounced deadline due--in particular--to the interference of foreign armed forces and foreign-backed armed groups. Whether or not one supports the view that the territory has been effectively decolonized, it is absolutely clear that Morocco's relationship with the territory and its population is in no way shape or form colonial and alien in nature; equally, it is absolutely clear that Morocco has not assumed the administration of the territory as an occupying Power (nor even as an administering Power) but by the implementation of a legitimate and internationally recognised agreement and a valid and long established claim to sovereignty. A State cannot belligerently occupy its own territory. Indeed, after decades upon decades of diplomatic and armed resistance, Morocco liberated the Sahara in 1975-76. The inapplicability of the law of occupation in this matter is further confirmed by the Security Council's handling of the Western Sahara issue under Chapter VI--Pacific Settlement of Disputes--of the U.N. Charter and, moreover, by the explicit endorsement of Morocco's autonomy initiative in UNSC resolutions (described as a "serious, realistic and credible" means to settle the dispute). Additionally, the legitimacy of the Kingdom of Morocco's presence and its exercise of authority in the entire Western Sahara Territory (west and east of the defensive sand berm) is also confirmed by the 1990 Settlement Plan and reinforced by the 2001 U.N. Framework Agreement relating to the territory. In fact, the latter explicitly calls--amongst other things--for "the preservation of the territorial integrity [of Morocco] against secessionist attempts from within or without the territory". What's more, taking into account the history and development of the controversy, it becomes wholly apparent that the fundamental issue at hand is not an international one, but a bilateral one between Morocco and Algeria, evidenced by Algeria's covert, overt and manifest political, diplomatic, financial and military involvement/intervention since the dawn of the dispute. Indeed, the so-called POLISARIO Front is firmly under the tutelage of Algeria, without whom their would be no POLISARIO Front. To add to this point, these three facts must also be fully recognized: 1) the lengthy history of Morocco's strident claims over the territory (voiced internationally in the modern-era since the 1950s); 2) the long struggle and profound acts of both the Moroccan Kingdom and Moroccan patriots to liberate the territory (including by irregular armed force); 3) the non-existence of any organisation (purporting to be a liberation movement) in the territory demanding independence and denying kinship to Morocco before the 1970s. A spade must be called a spade. This is a war by proxy and a blatant violation of international law and the U.N. Charter on the part of Algeria.

• In addition, any claim that the question of sovereignty was not effected by the Madrid Accords because the Kingdom of Spain didn’t exercise sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory cannot be said to be established in law. What’s more, the suggestion that Spain was not recognised as holding sovereignty over the territory due pure and simply to its status as a Non-Self-Governing-Territory is, in and of itself, ill-founded. In fact, the opposite is even said to be true: the sovereignty of the administering State over “their” possessions is reaffirmed by the U.N. Charter. To be sure, whilst a NSGT clearly has a status distinct from the metropolitan area of the administering State under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, that status does not necessarily deprive the administering State from the title of sovereignty it held prior to the Charters formation. Undoubtedly, obligations and restrictions have been imposed on the administering State, limiting their exercise of sovereignty over the territory, but the administering State nonetheless remains the sovereign power. Irrespective, that is all really besides the point. The Kingdom of Morocco never once sought to legitimise Spain’s claim to sovereign title over the Sahara (nor any other colonial claim or endeavour). In fact, Morocco’s core assertion, that the so-called Spanish Sahara was an occupied part of its own sovereign territory, was an unambiguous renunciation of the legitimacy of this Spanish sovereign claim. Indeed, it was Morocco who raised the issue of decolonization and brought the question of the so-called Spanish Sahara before the international community at a time when it was universally recognised as an integral part of the Kingdom of Spain (just as Sebta (Ceuta) and Melilia (Melilla) continue to be recognised as Spanish territories today!). It is in this context that the decolonization process and transfer of power must be understood, and to that end a number of precedents exist to demonstrate the legitimacy of the transfer of power from an administering Power to a claimant State on the basis of national unity and in pursuance of UNGA resolution 1514(XV). This continues to be evidenced to this very day by the U.N. handling of other sovereignty disputes involving territories classed as NSGTs. In fact, there is no predetermined form or procedure for ensuring the application of resolution 1514(XV); in other words, “the right of self-determination leaves the General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms and procedures by which that right is to be realized.”(Certainly if a norm, or even custom, has developed–or were to in the future–this cannot be said to have been the case in 1975-76.) Accordingly, regarding the Western Sahara territory specifically, the question of both form and procedure, and even the question of sovereignty were all explicitly tackled in 1965 by the very first UNGA resolution bearing directly on the issue: 2072(XX)–Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara–which urgently requested “the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories. Thus Spain certainly had the competence to negotiate problems relating to sovereignty; which, taking the resolution into context, were brought up by the Kingdom of Morocco–who made explicit territorial claims–before the U.N. Special Committee. Doubtless, had Spain acted responsibly and not allowed the decolonization process to drag on, this matter would have been resolved in 1965 in much the same manner as the decolonization of Tarfaya (Cape Juby, retroceded to Morocco in 1958 without any formal consultation)–a territory whose population is not only indistinguishable from that of the so-called Spanish Sahara, but who also enjoyed the same colonial struggles, history, fate and administration. (Before 1958, Tarfaya and Ifni, along with Wad ad-Dahab (Rio de Oro) and Saquia el Hamra (the latter two conjoined in 1958 to form the so-called Spanish Sahara) constituted a single administrative unit known as “Spanish West Africa”). Spain however, obstinately failed in its responsibilities. Resolution 2072(XX) was thus followed a year later, in 1966–the same year Algeria abruptly announced at the U.N. that the fate of the so-called Spanish Sahara was now of “vital interest” to them–by resolution 2229(XXI) which explicitly requested that Spain accelerate the decolonization of Ifni (according to Spanish censuses, possessed at the time of a significantly larger population than the so-called Spanish Sahara) vis-a-vis the “transfer of powers” and more tentatively invited Spain–“in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco”–to hold a referendum for the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara. This blatant hesitance on part of the UNGA in its handling of the Saharan territory, reflected both in the divergence of procedure and its mere invitation, is however clearly understood in the context of both Spain’s intransigence on the question of the so-called Spanish Sahara as well as–and more crucially–it’s diplomatic exploitation of the competing interests and claims made over the territory. Even so, resolution 2072(XX)–requesting the decolonization of all the territories within the framework of bilateral negotiations–was also reaffirmed in resolution 2229(XXI). In fact, resolution 2072(XX) was continually referenced (without exception) in every resolution bearing on the issue up until the Sahara’s decolonization in 1976. Moreover, what stands out in resolution 2229(XXI) is the affirmation that the peoples of Ifni (and not just the so-called Spanish Sahara) equally had an inalienable right to self-determination, thus proving that the transfer of power in pursuance of resolution 1514(XV) had not been recognised to contradict this right. In fact, these resolutions serve to highlight the applicability of this procedure in the decolonization process and, moreover, that it was specifically applicable in the decolonization of “Ifni and Spanish Sahara”, territories whose fates were not only politically tied through discussions at the General Assembly but administratively tied (being under the jurisdiction of the same commanding officer and formerly being administered as a single colonial unit–which, as already mentioned, also included Tarfaya). Indeed, this was not only clearly implied, but it is absolutely how Morocco–who not only supported the resolutions, but helped draft them–understood them. The Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara was indivisible and brought up by Morocco at the international level as far back as the 1950s (when the territory was still a part of what was known as “Spanish West Africa”). It must also be emphasised that Morocco was not a peripheral figure in Africa’s emancipation struggle but that it stood at the forefront of the decolonization process and anti-colonial endeavours of the entire continent (and beyond), all the while asserting its own right to its complete decolonization (one respecting its national unity and territorial integrity). This ancient Kingdom–who formally brought an end to the French Protectorate in March 1956 (inspiring generations with its heroic resistance), thereafter actively partaking in the formulation of the international principles governing the decolonisation process–incessantly sought the return of its usurped lands, with profound expressions of the united will of its people demonstrated politically, diplomatically and on the battle-field. Here it must be said that the Kingdom of Morocco’s ostensible colonial experience was unique amongst the world. Foremost, it was not a nation born out of colonial circumstance or designs but had an immensely ancient and internationally recognised existence. Indeed, Morocco was never a European colony, it was a sovereign state that had only succumbed to a protectorate status in 1912. Secondly, although arousing the interest of all the major European powers of the time (the First and Second Moroccan Crisis), Morocco fell predominately under the control of two European powers – who not only competed between themselves for spheres of influence (dividing Morocco like a spoil of war), but who also harboured their own territorial ambitions over large parts of Moroccan land, which they conspired to usurp and annex to their own respective empires (a process that began even before the 1912 protectorate) and in contravention of international law and agreements. Simply put, this historically-rooted Kingdom not only had to contend separately with two dominant powers, but two powers who both had vested interests in denying Morocco its right to national unity and territorial integrity. Thus, as the pages of history bear witness, Morocco’s liberation struggle proved to be an arduous process, with liberation coming in stages: Spain’s Northern Zone returning to Morocco in April 1956 (with the exception of Sebta, Melilia and various offshore Islands which remain, to this very day, under the occupation of Spain), the international city of Tangier (with no less than thirteen Powers ruling over it) returning in October 1956, the province of Tarfaya returning in 1958 and the non-self-governing territory of Ifni–twice the size of Bahrain and Singapore, significantly larger than Hong Kong and relatively equal to Guadeloupe–returning in June 1969 without the formal consultation of the population. The Kingdom of Morocco never once lent itself to the colonialist attempts to give the so-called Spanish Sahara special treatment. Accordingly, by calling on the concerned states to enter into negotiations in UNSC resolution 377, the Security Council left them at liberty to determine the satisfactory conditions of a settlement. The effect of the Madrid Accords–which took account of “the views of the Saharan population, as expressed through the Jema’a”–and UNGA resolutions 3458(XXX)A/B on both the decolonisation process and the question of sovereignty is thus quite clear. Indeed, Morocco–in stark contrast to India, who embarked on unilateral military action to forcibly liberate and annex Goa (after 450 years of Portuguese rule)–has reconsolidated its title by acting strictly within the limits of modern international law.

• By contrast, the POLISARIO's declaration of independence and proclamation of a Sahrawi ARAB Democratic Republic (SADR) over the territory of the Western Sahara on 27 February 1976 was a unilateral declaration of a fictitious "state-in-exile" (a concept with no legal basis). Whereas to qualify as a subject under international law a State must be sovereign, possessing the following qualities: a permanent population; a defined territory--further: "a defined territory over which sovereignty is not seriously contested by any other state"; government --further: "effective control over the state's territory and population"; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Montevideo Convention 1933). At no time in history has the so-called "SADR" possessed the requisite qualities of a State. Remember, the Polisario Front gulags--their "state-in-exile"--are situated and head-quartered in Algerian-occupied Tindouf; furthermore, not only does Algeria house the movement on its territory, but it supports it financially, politically, militarily and logistically (to reiterate: in violation of the 1963 and 1964 O.A.U. backed Algero-Moroccan ceasefire accords (specifying a demilitarised zone encompassing the area) and, even more brazenly, in contravention of both Article 2(6) and Article 3(2) of the O.A.U/A.U. Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa). Essentially, the entire existence of the Algerian Front, and certainly that of its phantom entity (the so-called SADR), is dependent upon Algeria. The illegitimate admission of this entity into the A.U.'s predecessor, the O.A.U., and its continued presence within the A.U. today, thus represents a heavy stain on the pan-African organisation and its credibility. Indeed, it is regrettable, if not altogether reprehensible, that this pan-African body (of which Morocco (within the Casablanca group) was a prominent architect)--established to promote peace, unity and security, and to defend the rights and interests of Africans--finds itself today not only prejudicing U.N. led peace talks (and in so doing becoming itself an obstacle to a political settlement) but also finds itself promoting disunity and neo-colonial machinations, as well as alienating the most ancient and of one of the most important states in Africa, whose exemplary development programmes and strategies (in every field), much sought-after technical expertise and competence in international peace and security matters would have all been placed at the service of the A.U. for the decades in which it had remained absent. We must therefore be honest in asking ourselves why this controversy was allowed to pass? It should thus be recalled that in 1981, during the O.A.U. summit in Nairobi, Morocco proposed holding a referendum in order to reaffirm its legitimate rights to the Saharan territory and thus end the artificial conflict imposed on it by Algeria and its allies. In the backdrop to this ground-breaking development, in 1979 the O.A.U adopted--on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee of Wise Men (led predominantly by the initiatives of nations supporting the Algerian thesis)--a radical resolution which Morocco flatly rejected; boosted by this the POLISARIO Front, under the banner of the so-called SADR, applied for membership into the O.A.U, thus prompting Morocco to raise a prejudicial question at the next O.A.U summit in 1980, Freetown, demonstrating the inadmissibility of the application according to its interpretation of the O.A.U charter; this, in Morocco's view, made it necessary under Article 27 of the O.A.U. charter for the question to be settled by a two-thirds majority under the competence of the O.A.U supreme authority, the Conference of Heads of State and Government. After lengthy and heated debate, the majority of nations adopted Morocco's position. The request submitted by the so-called SADR (POLISARIO Front) was therefore left frozen pending the settlement of the prejudicial question. Consequently, a more moderate position was adopted by the O.A.U. in its resolution which had the add-on effect of moderating the actions of the Committee of Wise Men at its next session. The priorities set forth by the O.A.U were a ceasefire and a referendum. Following this, the 1981 Moroccan referendum proposal was therefore welcomed by the O.A.U who adopted a resolution giving a seven-nation Implementation Committee (IC) full power to organise a referendum. The same resolution 1. invited the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate ceasefire; 2. requested the implementation committee to meet before the end of August 1981 to work out, in collaboration with the parties to the conflict, the modalities and all the details relating to the establishment of a ceasefire as well as to the organization and the holding of a referendum; 3. requested the United Nations to furnish, in collaboration with the O.A.U., a peacekeeping force to be stationed in Western Sahara to maintain peace and security during the referendum and subsequent elections; and 4. instructed the implementation committee to take, with the participation of the United Nations, all necessary measures to guarantee the holding of a general and regular referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. (No reference was made to the POLISARIO Front or to the necessity of direct negotiations. Equally, no demand was made for the withdrawal of the Moroccan administration/forces from the territory.) Thus, between August 1981 and February 1982, the IC sought to establish the necessary procedures for the fulfilment of its mandate. Algeria and its minions however succeeded in both blocking and then sabotaging the initiative (as well as future, affirmative O.A.U. involvement). It did so 1. militarily, by escalating the capabilities and intensity of the POLISARIO Fronts war of attrition (using guerrilla tactics), supplying the POLISARIO Front with highly-sophisticated weaponry including heavy battle tanks and the latest Soviet surface-to-air missiles which were used for the first time in the entire duration of the conflict in late October 1981; and 2. Diplomatically; this effort was two-fold: foremost stalling the referendum process and IC initiatives by demanding both the withdrawal of Morocco from the territory and direct negotiations with the POLISARIO Front guerrillas as a prerequisite to holding a referendum (counter to the agreements reached at the previous AU summit); secondly, and more or less simultaneously, by an effort to torpedo the process through the legitimisation within the O.A.U. itself of the so-called SADR. Thus, in August 1981 Algeria succeeded in persuading the O.A.U Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo, to call upon the "SADR" to partake in the IC meeting; an illegitimate manoeuvre which was subsequently followed by Edem Kodjo's decision to effectively and unilaterally admit the so-called SADR into the continental body on 28 February 1982 by inviting it to take a seat at the 38th regular session of the Council of Ministers, in defiance of the conclusions drawn at the 1980 Freetown Summit by the Heads of State and against the regulations of the O.A.U Charter! Of course, this was met with serious protest from African leaders who desired to see the integrity and credibility of the organisation--already dogged by claims of being a Dictators Club--respected. (The so-called SADR would not however become a full-fledged member until 1984, whereupon Morocco withdrew from the organisation.) Consequently, any meaningful involvement of the O.A.U was over, it could not be both judge and party to the dispute. Whilst the POLISARIO Front rejoiced at this illegitimate coup, declaring that their "statehood has now been legitimised by the O.A.U.", King Hassan II eschewed the pan-African body and stood before the U.N. General Assembly in 1983 to appeal for the immediate organisation of a referendum under U.N. aegis; this would subsequently pave the way for the direct involvement of the U.N. Security Council under whose initiatives the Sahara dossier remains. We thus look forward to the compliance with the A.U. of this process, and we equally look forward to the emergence of even more credible regimes in Africa with which to partner - whose leaders are neither blindly dictated by ideological considerations nor driven by an interest to accumulate personal wealth through illegitimate means, but who are guided by the principles of truth, justice and development. It is only with such people that the future can belong to Africa.

• There has never Been a country labeled SADR in history,only a puppet of neighbor algeria and the step-son of kaddafi libya.
  So please Stop telling BS!